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NOTES
SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION EX POST FACTO: THE
HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MICHIGAN’S
SEX OFFENDERS REGISTRATION ACT
Alexander William Furtaw*
INTRODUCTION
Is Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (“MSORA”) constitutional? Until
2016, courts routinely said yes. 1 In 2016, the Sixth Circuit in Does #1–5 v. Snyder
held that the statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. 2 In 2021, the Michigan
Supreme Court echoed the Sixth Circuit’s holding in People v. Betts. 3 In response,
the Michigan legislature passed Public Law 295 of 2020 to amend MSORA, 4 and
courts treat the amended act as a “new” statute. 5 Critical analysis of the amended
statute’s legality is difficult because the state legislature has seemingly ignored constitutional issues with statutory proposals until after the fact, and consequently the
amended statute’s constitutionality is unclear.
A class action challenging MSORA on multiple constitutional grounds is currently pending in federal court. 6 The U.S. Solicitor General agreed with the Sixth
Circuit that the old statute violated the federal Ex Post Facto Clause 7 and Michigan’s
Attorney implied that she believes the statute may not survive rational basis review. 8
The 2021 amendments to MSORA preserved many of the provisions challenged by
the plaintiffs in Does #1–5 v. Snyder. 9 This Note evaluates potential constitutional

* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2023; B.A. in Political Science/Pre-law, Michigan State University, 2020. I would like to thank Professor Sherif Girgis for his helpful feedback and Phillip
Klindt, Morgan Cleary, and the rest of my colleagues on the Journal of Legislation for their scrupulous edits.
1. See Ryan W. Porte, Note, Sex Offender Regulations and the Rule of Law: When Civil Regulatory
Schemes Circumvent the Constitution, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715, 734 (2018).
2. (Does I Appeal), 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016).
3. 968 N.W.2d 497, 515 (Mich. 2021).
4. Act of Dec. 29, 2020, Pub. Act No. 295, 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. 2232 (West).
5. Amended Final Judgment at 2 n.1, Doe v. Snyder (Does II), 449 F. Supp 3d 719 (E.D. Mich. 2020)
(No. 16-13137); Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 500 n.2, 521 n.30.
6. See Does v. Whitmer (Does III), No. 2:22-cv-10209 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2022). The complaint alleges
violations of the federal Ex Post Facto, infra note 281, 317, Due Process, infra note 119, 281, and Equal Protection Clauses, infra note 247, as well as the First Amendment, infra note 329. Verified Class Action Complaint
at 167–86, Does III, No. 2:22-cv-10209.
7. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 10–13, Snyder v. Doe, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (mem.)
(No. 16-768), denying cert. to Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 696.
8. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel at 33, Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 497
(No. 148981) (“[R]egardless of what one believes about recidivism rates, [sex offender] registries are not good
tools to protect the public.”).
9. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.721–28.736 (West 2020), with id. §§ 28.722, 28.723a–
28.725a, 28.727–28.729 (Supp. 2021).
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challenges to MSORA, identifies challenges that could be successful, and suggests
actions that the State could take to remedy constitutional repugnancies.
Part I surveys the numerous amendments to MSORA since its enactment in 1994.
Part II reviews the recent rulings from the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme
Court and the amendments to MSORA enacted in response. Parts III–VI evaluate the
merits of potential constitutional challenges to MSORA under the equal protection,
due process, bill of attainder, ex post facto, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, and other clauses of the federal and Michigan constitutions.
Part III discusses procedural due process challenges to MSORA and avers that
the statute is likely immune from them because its obligations and restrictions only
apply to individuals that have already been convicted of crimes. Part III also examines a recent case brought by an individual wrongfully subject to MSORA and suggests that Michigan can take steps to avoid exposing state actors and municipalities
to liability in the future.
Part IV assesses whether MSORA infringes on fundamental rights protected by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and Michigan constitutions. Part IV notes that the federal and state equal protection and due process clauses
protect the same bundle of rights as far as MSORA is concerned, courts will not apply
strict scrutiny to MSORA, and the statute has never failed the rational basis test concerning due process and equal protection challenges.
Part V addresses myriad challenges alleging that MSORA imposes unconstitutional punishment in violation of the bill of attainder, double jeopardy, ex post facto,
and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the federal and Michigan constitutions.
Section V.A claims that MSORA is not a bill of attainder. Section V.B explains how
the protections afforded by the state and federal double jeopardy, ex post facto, and
cruel and unusual punishment clauses overlap in the context of sex offender registration laws, rendering the state and federal cruel and unusual punishment clauses superfluous as applied to sex offenders. Section V.B also determines that although the
state and federal double jeopardy clauses are more protective than the state and federal ex post facto clauses, a successful state or federal ex post facto challenge may be
more powerful than a successful state or federal double jeopardy challenge. Section
V.C details that courts apply the intent-effects test when evaluating ex post facto and
double jeopardy challenges to MSORA. Section V.C concludes that the Sixth Circuit
and Michigan Supreme Court decisions, which invalidated the old MSORA under the
intent-effects test, turned on whether MSORA passed the rational basis test.
Part VI considers whether MSORA as recently amended passes the rational basis
test applied by the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court. Part VI also scrutinizes data that the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court cited in concluding that MSORA’s obligations and restrictions were not rationally related to a legitimate purpose. Part VI asserts that the Michigan legislature could have rationally
disagreed with the conclusions drawn from these data by the Sixth Circuit and the
Michigan Supreme Court.
Part VII analyzes whether MSORA violates sex offenders’ rights to a jury trial
and anonymous speech. Section VII.A concludes that although MSORA does not
violate the right against self-incrimination under well-established precedent, the
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statute is more vulnerable to such challenges in the future if courts follow the Sixth
Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court. Section VII.B observes that recent amendments to MSORA made the statute susceptible to a First Amendment challenge and
that the Michigan legislature should amend MSORA again should it wish to avoid
such a challenge.
I.

MICHIGAN’S SEX OFFENDERS REGISTRATION ACT

Following several high-profile child abductions and rapes by adult men in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, States passed the first sex offender registration laws. 10
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice reported that thirty percent of female rape
victims in Michigan were younger than thirteen years old and twenty-five percent
were younger than ten years old. 11 On the same day that this report was published,
Michigan passed the State’s first sex offender registration law, the Sex Offenders
Registration Act. 12 Congress soon enacted minimum standards for sex offender laws
and conditioned the receipt of substantial federal funding for law enforcement on
States’ compliance with these guidelines. 13
MSORA is a set of rules and obligations ostensibly designed to promote public
safety that has been amended many times. 14 Identifying the individuals to whom
specific provisions of MSORA apply, when they apply, and for how long, has grown
more difficult with each amendment to the statute. The state legislature has amended
the statute twenty-three times—an average of almost once per year—in the nearly
twenty-five years since it was enacted in 1994. 15 To draw any conclusions about the
constitutionality of the current version of MSORA, it is necessary to understand how
the statute has evolved over the last three decades.
This Part discusses the evolution of MSORA since it was first enacted. Section
I.A discusses how the statute functioned at first. Section I.B details amendments to
the statute’s reporting requirements. Section I.C examines changes to Michigan’s
sex offender registry. Section I.D and I.E survey changes to MSORA enacted in
2011, including the implementation of the statute’s current tier system. Section I.F
and I.G focus on two controversial elements of the statute: its treatment of non-adult
offenders and student safety zones.

10. See Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. U. L. REV.
799, 794–96 (1996).
11. PATRICK A. LANGAN & CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CHILD RAPE VICTIMS, 1992
(1994), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/CRV92.pdf.
12. Sex Offenders Registration Act, Pub. Act No. 295, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 1522.
13. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 170101, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1797, 2038–42.
14. See Sex Offenders Registration Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.721–28.730 (West 2020 & Supp.
2021).
15. See id. Historical and Statutory Notes.
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In the Beginning: Registration for the Sake of the Registry

MSORA requires individuals convicted of offenses listed in the statute, called
“listed offenses,” to register with law enforcement once they begin a non-incarceratory sentence or are released from prison. 16 Sex offenders must provide certain information to law enforcement upon initial registration, 17 and this information is used
to create profiles for each offender in the state sex offender registry. 18 Registrants
must comply with MSORA during their registration periods 19 or face penalties. 20
At first, only Michigan residents convicted of a listed offense after September
1995 were required to register. 21 Upon initial registration, sex offenders provided
law enforcement with their names, social security numbers, addresses, and photographs. 22 Registrants were also required to report changes to their addresses in-person at their local police stations within ten days. 23 Only law enforcement could access registrants’ information in the sex offender database. 24
Offenders were required to register for twenty-five years following a conviction
for a single listed offense after September 1995 and for life following a subsequent
conviction for a listed offense. 25 In 1994, registrants’ only ongoing obligations were
to immediately report any changes to their addresses. 26 Non-compliance with
MSORA was a felony punishable by four years in prison and a $2,000 fine. 27 The
original MSORA did not remain static for long.
B.

Stage II: Periodic Reporting and the Public Sex Offender Registry

In 1999, non-registrant offenders employed or attending school in Michigan were
required to register, 28 penalties for non-compliance were made more severe, 29 and
more offenses requiring registration were added to MSORA. 30 Only individuals convicted of the newly added offenses after the 1999 amendments were required to register as sex offenders. 31 All offenders convicted of even one serious offense were
required to register for life. 32 Registrants were also required to immediately report

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id. § 28.723 (2020).
Id. §§ 28.724a, 28.727(1) (Supp. 2021).
Id. § 28.728.
Id. § 28.725(11)–(13).
See id. § 28.729.
Sex Offenders Registration Act, Pub. Act No. 295, § 3, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 1522, 1523–24.
Id. § 7(1), 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1525.
Id. § 5(1), 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1524–25.
Id. §§ 8, 10, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1526.
Id. § 5(3)–(4), 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1525.
See id. § 5, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1524–25.
Id. § 9(1), 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts at 1526.
Act of June 28, 1999, Pub. Act No. 85, § 3(1), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 271, 273.
See id. § 2(d), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 272.
See id. § 9, 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 280–81.
Id. § 3(2), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 273.
Id. § 5(7), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 276.
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changes in their employment or school enrollment 33 and periodically report in-person
to “update” the information they provided when they initially registered, even if their
information had not changed. 34 Registrants convicted of less serious offenses reported annually and registrants convicted of more serious offenses reported quarterly. 35 Other significant changes were made to the database of sex offenders.
C. Michigan’s E-Registry: There Goes the Neighborhood
In 1997, the legislature created a public sex offender registry (“PSOR”) in addition to the existing law enforcement registry. 36 Sex offenders’ names, physical descriptions, birth dates, and convictions were made available at local police posts to
anyone living in the same zip code as a registrant. 37 The PSOR was made even more
accessible to the public following an unsuccessful legal challenge to prevent the public release of offenders’ information. 38
The Michigan State Police published the PSOR online in 1999. 39 This change
allowed anyone to browse a list of sex offenders living near them on the internet, 40
which soon included registrants’ schools 41 and photographs. 42 The State also enabled
individuals to opt into a notification system informing them when registrants moved
to their area. 43 In 2011, MSORA was effectively re-written in its entirety. 44
D. Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III: The Bad, the Very Bad, and the Damned
The 2011 amendments separated listed offenses into three tiers. 45 Individuals
with no prior convictions for sex offenses convicted of a Tier I offense are placed in
Tier I. 46 Individuals with no prior convictions for sex offenses who are convicted of
a Tier II offense, and current Tier I offenders convicted of a subsequent Tier I offense,
are considered Tier II offenders. 47 Individuals with no prior convictions for sex
33. Id. § 5(1)(a), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 275.
34. Id. § 5a(4), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts at 277.
35. Id.
36. See Act of Jan. 7, 1997, Pub. Act No. 494, §§ 8(2), 10(3), 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 2283, 2284–85.
37. See id.
38. Ilaina Jonas, Lists of Sex Offenders to Be Released, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr. 1, 1997, at 1A.
39. David Ashenfelter, Sex Offender List to Hit Web, DET. FREE PRESS, Feb. 1, 1999, at 1A. The State
codified the online PSOR later in 1999. Act of June 28, 1999, Pub. Act No. 85, § 8(2), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts
271, 279–80.
40. To view Michigan’s online registry, refer to https://mspsor.com/.
41. Act of July 25, 2002, Pub. Act No. 542, § 8(3)(b), 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 1901, 1907.
42. Act of May 1, 2005, Pub. Act No. 238, § 8(3)(c), 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 780, 781.
43. Act of Jan. 1, 2007, Pub. Act No. 46, § 10(3), 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 129, 130.
44. Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 17, 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 82 (West) (enacting 2011 amendments
to MSORA); Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 18, 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 94 (West) (also enacting 2011
amendments to MSORA).
45. For an illustration of MSORA’s tiers and their corresponding listed offenses, see SUZZANE LOWE,
SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, S.B. 188, 189, & 206: SUMMARY AS ENACTED, S. 96, Reg. Sess. of 2011, at 3 tbl. 1
(Mich. 2012), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2011-SFA-0188-N
.pdf.
46. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.722(q) (West Supp. 2021).
47. Id. § 28.722(s).
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offenses convicted of a Tier II offense, and current Tier II offenders convicted of a
subsequent Tier I or Tier II offense, are designated as Tier III offenders. 48
Individuals convicted of a listed offense that formerly did not require registration
and subsequently convicted of any felony, regardless of whether the conviction was
for a sex offense, after July 1, 2011, are required to register as sex offenders. 49 All
non-residents convicted of a listed offense in Michigan are also required to register
regardless of whether they are working or studying in Michigan. 50 However, they
are exempt from periodic and immediate reporting requirements. 51 Individuals convicted of most Tier I offenses are also exempt from being listed in the PSOR. 52
The 2011 53 and subsequent 54 amendments also added new listed offenses. Unlike the offenses added in 1999, individuals convicted of these new listed offenses
occurring after September 1995 are retroactively required to register as sex offenders. 55 The 2011 amendments also removed some offenses, 56 and registrants must
petition courts to discontinue registration if their offense of conviction no longer requires registration under MSORA. 57 The 2011 amendments to MSORA vastly expanded the amount of information registrants must report upon initial registration.
E.

2011 Amendments: Registration for the Sake of Registration?

Following the enactment of the 2011 amendments, offenders must report their
birth dates, employers, schools they attend, driver’s license numbers, professional
licensing information, and more when they initially register as sex offenders. 58 Registrants are also required to report all telephone numbers, email addresses, instant
messaging usernames, and the plate number and description of any vehicle that they
“routinely used.” 59
The 2011 amendments significantly altered other aspects of MSORA as well.
For example, the periodic and immediate reporting regimes were changed; Tier I, II,
and III offenders must report annually, bi-annually, and quarterly, respectively. 60 The
amendments also narrowed the window of time during which registrants must report
changes to information triggering immediate in-person reporting from ten days to

48. Id. § 28.722(u).
49. Id. § 28.723(1)(e) (2020).
50. Id. § 28.723(3).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 28.728(4)(c).
53. See Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 17, § 2(s), (u), (w), 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 82, 84–86 (West).
54. See Act of Oct. 15, 2014, Pub. Law No. 328, § 2(u)(vii), https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20
13-2014/publicact/pdf/2014-PA-0328.pdf.
55. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.723 (West 2020).
56. See Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 17, § 2(s), (u), (w).
57. . MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.728c(15)(b) (West 2020). State officials also have a duty to remove
individuals’ information from the public and law enforcement databases when state officials discover they are
no longer required to register as sex offenders. Id. § 28.728(9) (Supp. 2021).
58. Id. § 28.727(c), (f)–(g), (k), (m).
59. ACT OF Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 18, § 7(1)(h)–(j), 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 95, 95 (West).
60. Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 17, § 5a(3), 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 82, 92 (West).
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three days. 61 Registrants are also required to immediately notify law enforcement
when they intend to stay anywhere other than their reported address for more than
seven days. 62
Some changes implemented by the 2011 amendments have since been rolled
back in response to adverse court rulings. 63 Specifically, registrants were required to
report when they created any new email address, instant messaging username, or “any
other designations used in internet communications or postings,” and when they began to “regularly operate” any new vehicle or stopped using an old vehicle. 64 Registrants’ email and instant messaging addresses and other online usernames were not
listed in the PSOR. 65
F.

Non-Adult Offenders: Are the Kids Alright?

A “conviction” for a listed offense triggers MSORA obligations, 66 and a conviction as defined by MSORA includes judgments of conviction entered in both adult
criminal proceedings and in proceedings applicable only to non-adult offenders. 67
1. Juvenile Offenders
Some individuals convicted in juvenile courts must register as sex offenders.68
Michigan’s juvenile courts have jurisdiction over individuals younger than eighteen
who were charged with most crimes. 69 Originally, all juveniles convicted of listed
offenses in Michigan whose dispositions were public were required to register. 70
Since 2011, however, only juveniles convicted of Tier III offenses for conduct that
occurred when they were at least fourteen years old are required to register. 71 Unlike
the offenders discussed in the next Section, juvenile offenders have never been listed
in the PSOR. 72
2. Youthful Offenders
Some individuals convicted in an adult criminal court who were assigned youthful trainee status under Michigan’s Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (“HYTA”) 73 must
register as sex offenders. 74 Courts may assign youthful trainee status to individuals
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. § 2(g), 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 83.
. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.725(2)(b) (West Supp. 2021).
See infra Section II.D (discussing court rulings).
Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 17 § 5(1)(f)–(g).
Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 18 § 8(3)(e).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.723 (West 2020).
Id. § 28.722(a) (Supp. 2021).
See id. § 28.722(a)(iii)–(iv).
Id. § 712A.2 (2012 & Supp. 2021).
Sex Offenders Registration Act, Pub. Act No. 295, § 2(a)(iii), 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 1522, 1522–23.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.722(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2021).
See Act of June 28, 1999, Pub. Act No. 85, § 8(2), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 271, 279.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 762.11–762.15 (West 2000 & Supp. 2021).
Id. § 28.722(a)(ii) (Supp. 2021).
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between the ages of fourteen and twenty-six who are convicted of certain crimes. 75
Courts may require youthful trainees to attend school, maintain employment, serve
jail time, or comply with probation. 76 Once youthful trainees fulfill their HYTA requirements, their charges are dismissed. 77 Unlike juvenile sex offenders, HYTA sex
offenders have always been listed in the PSOR. 78 Formerly, all individuals assigned
youthful trainee status for a listed offense were required to register as sex offenders
regardless of whether they completed their HYTA requirements and their convictions
were dismissed. 79
In 2004, the legislature narrowed HYTA eligibility to exclude many individuals
convicted of more serious sex offenses. 80 Further, individuals convicted of a listed
offense and assigned youthful trainee status after October 2004 were only required
to register as sex offenders if their HYTA status was revoked. 81 However, HYTA sex
offenders assigned youthful trainee status before October 2004 were still required to
register regardless of whether they completed their HYTA requirements. 82 Later, the
2011 amendments exempted all post-October 2004 HYTA offenders from registration, but pre-October 2004 registrants’ statuses were not changed. 83
G. Student “Safety” Zones
The Michigan legislature added de jure affirmative restrictions to MSORA in
2005 after the Detroit News reported that sex offenders were employed by or had
volunteered with several Michigan schools. 84 The restrictions applied in so-called
“[s]tudent safety zones,” or “the area that lies 1,000 feet or less from school property.” 85 Most registrants were prohibited from living, working, or “[l]oitering”
within student safety zones. 86 Loitering was defined as “remain[ing] for a period of
time and under circumstances that a reasonable person would determine is for the
primary purpose of observing or contacting minors.” 87 There were narrow exceptions to the student safety zone restrictions and specific restrictions did not apply
retroactively. 88
75. See id. § 762.11.
76. Id. §§ 762.11(5)–(6), 762.13.
77. Id. § 762.14.
78. Compare Act of June 28, 1999, Pub. Act No. 85, § 8(2), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 271, 279 (the original
PSOR provision containing no exception for HYTA offenders), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.728(3)
(West Supp. 2021) (current PSOR exceptions which do not include HYTA offenders).
79. See Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 18, § 8(1), 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 95, 96–97 (West) (exempting
juvenile offenders from the PSOR but not HYTA offenders).
80. Act of July 21, 2004, Pub. Act No. 239, § 11(3), 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 782, 783.
81. Act of July 21, 2004, Pub. Act No. 240, § 2(a)(ii)(B), Mich. Pub. Acts 785, 786.
82. Id. § 2(a)(ii)(A), 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts at 785.
83. Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 17 § 2(b)(ii).
84. PATRICK AFFHOLTER, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, S.B. 129, 606, 607, 616, & 617, AND H.B. 4932 & 4934:
ENROLLED ANALYSIS, S. 93, Reg. Sess. of 2005, at 1 (Mich. 2006), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/docum
ents/2005-2006/billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2005-SFA-0129-E.pdf.
85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.733(f) (West 2020).
86. Id. § 28.734(1).
87. Id. § 28.733(b).
88. See id. §§ 28.734(3), 28.735(3), 28.736(1).
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For example, the residency restrictions did not apply retroactively to registrants
living within a student safety zone before 2006, but only registrants’ current addresses were grandfathered in; registrants were prohibited from moving from a
grandfathered address inside a student safety zone to a new address inside a student
safety zone. 89 However, individuals registered as sex offenders for the first time after
January 1, 2006, were required to move outside of a student safety zone within ninety
days of their registration. 90 The next Part discusses three court cases which led Michigan to dismantle or reform many of the provisions detailed in this Part.
II. DOES I, DOES II, BETTS, AND THE “NEW” MSORA
A.

Does I: Lex Est Non Poena

In 2013, five registrants challenged MSORA in Does 1–4 v. Snyder (“Does I”). 91
The ACLU argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that MSORA violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that parts of the statute were unconstitutionally vague. 92
Judge Robert H. Cleland for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the plaintiffs’
ex post facto claims 93 but agreed with the ACLU that parts of the statute were
vague. 94
Judge Cleland held that MSORA’s student safety zone restrictions were vague
as applied because the statute did not clearly define where the 1,000-foot exclusion
zones began and ended and the definition of “loiter” was ambiguous. 95 Judge Cleland also concluded that requiring registrants to report all telephone numbers, email
addresses, and instant messaging addresses that they “routinely used” and any vehicles that they “regularly operate[d]” was facially vague because “routinely” was undefined. 96 The plaintiffs appealed Judge Cleland’s rulings in January 2016 in Does
#1–5 v. Snyder (“Does I Appeal”). 97
B.

Does I Appeal: And Now for Something Completely Different

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Cleland’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’
ex post facto claims. 98 The court, focusing on MSORA’s student safety zone provisions, the listing of registrants’ tiers in the PSOR, and in-person reporting requirements, held that the statute’s “2006 and 2011 amendments” violated the Ex Post Facto
89. Id. § 28.735(3)(c).
90. Id. § 28.735(4).
91. 932 F. Supp. 2d 803 (E.D. Mich. 2013), rev’d, Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016).
92. Id. at 808.
93. Id. at 814, 824.
94. See Does v Snyder (Does I), 101 F. Supp. 3d 672, 680–93 (E.D. Mich. 2015); see also People v. Solloway, 891 N.W.2d 255, 264–66 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam) (concluding that the same provisions challenged in Does I as vague were unconstitutionally vague under state law).
95. Does I, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 682–86.
96. Id. at 686–90.
97. 834 F.3d at 696.
98. Id. at 706.
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Clause. 99 The Sixth Circuit remanded without considering the plaintiffs’ other challenges. 100 On remand, Judge Cleland entered a declaratory judgment that the 2006
and 2011 amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and enjoined their enforcement against the plaintiffs. 101
C. Does II and Betts: Lex Est Poena
The ACLU, recognizing that the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Does I Appeal was
not necessarily limited to the Does I plaintiffs, filed Does v. Snyder (“Does II”), a
class action on behalf of all sex offenders registered in Michigan who were convicted
before the 2006 and 2011 amendments to MSORA were passed. 102 In Does II, also
heard by Judge Cleland, the court applied Does I Appeal to the entire class and held
that the 2006 and 2011 amendments to MSORA could not be applied to any class
member convicted before the amendments’ effective dates. 103
Unfortunately for the State, the 2011 amendments essentially re-wrote MSORA,
rendering what remained of the statute in their absence “a ‘nonsensical alphabet soup’
of sentence fragments.” 104 Consequently, the court held that the 2011 amendments
were not severable from the rest of the statute and enjoined the State from enforcing
MSORA against all Michigan’s sex offenders, regardless of whether they were convicted after the 2011 amendments became effective. 105 A parallel suit filed in state
court, People v. Betts, reached the Michigan Supreme Court while litigation in Does
II was taking place. 106
In Betts, the Michigan Supreme Court applied the same analysis as the Sixth
Circuit had in Does I Appeal and held that the 2011 amendments were unconstitutional under the ex post facto clause of the Michigan constitution. 107 The Michigan
legislature passed 2020 P.A. 295 to amend MSORA before the final judgments in
Does II and Betts. 108
Judge Cleland specified that Does II “did not address the constitutionality of the
new SORA,” defined as “the version of [the statute] . . . in effect as of March 24,
2021, including both sections that were not amended by Public Act 295 of 2020.” 109
99. Id. “2006 amendments” ostensibly referred to the amendments which added MSORA’s student safety
provisions. See id. at 698.
100. Id. at 706.
101. Stipulated Final Judgment at 2, Does I, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (No. 12-11194).
102. 449 F. Supp. 3d 719, 725–26 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
103. Id. at 729.
104. Id. at 732.
105. Id. at 733. The fact that Judge Cleland held that the statute in the absence of the 2011 amendments
was non-functional means that the court likely invalidated not just the problematic provisions contained within
the 2011 amendments, but rather both public laws passed in 2011 in toto. The parties conceded that the 2006
amendments were severable, but the point was mooted by the non-severability of the 2011 amendments. Id. at
733 n.9.
106. See 968 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 2021).
107. Id. at 507–15. The Betts majority also agreed with Judge Cleland that the 2011 amendments were nonseverable. Id. at 515–18. Contra id. at 521–29 (Viviano, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Act of Dec. 29, 2020, Pub. Act No. 295, 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. 2232 (West).
109. Amended Final Judgment at 2 n.1, 4 ¶ 2–3, Does II, 449 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (No. 1613137).
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The Michigan Supreme Court similarly limited Betts to the “old” MSORA. 110 The
State was permanently enjoined from prosecuting registrants for violations of
MSORA that occurred before March 24, 2021. 111 The statute has not been amended
since 2020 P.A. 295 became effective in March 2021.
D. The “New” MSORA
2020 P.A. 295 introduced a bevy of changes to MSORA. 112 Most significantly,
the legislature completely removed the statute’s student safety provisions. 113 The
amendments also added a scienter requirement for violations of MSORA’s immediate reporting provisions. 114 Further, individuals whose convictions for listed offenses
were later set aside or expunged, and pre-2004 youthful trainees who completed their
HYTA requirements, were exempted from registering as sex offenders. 115 2020 P.A.
295 also introduced changes to the statute’s reporting requirements and the information available in the PSOR. 116
Local police departments may now allow registrants to report changes to their
information remotely instead of in-person. 117 The “routine use” qualifier was removed from the phone number and vehicle reporting requirements, which, along with
the email and instant messaging address reporting requirements, now only apply to
individuals who first registered after July 1, 2011. 118 However, post-July 1, 2011,
registrants must also report “all designations used for self-identification or routing in
internet communications or posting.” 119 Further, the provision explicitly excluding
registrants’ online usernames from the PSOR was repealed. 120 Registrants’ tier designations were also removed from the PSOR. 121
Though 2020 P.A. 295 addressed many of the issues identified by the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court, the amendments potentially created other issues. The following Parts discuss potential challenges to the new MSORA under the
federal and Michigan constitutions. 122

110. Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 500 n.2, 521 n.30.
111. Amended Final Judgment at 4 ¶ 2–3, Does II, 449 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (No. 16-13137).
112. See Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 518 n.25.
113. See Act of Dec. 29, 2020, 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2249.
114. Id. § 9(2), 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2248.
115. Id. § 2(a)(i)–(ii), 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2232.
116. See id. § 5, 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2239–41.
117. Id. § 5(1), 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2239.
118. Id. § 5(2)(a).
119. Id. § 2(g), 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2233. The Does III plaintiffs argue that these amended provisions
are still unconstitutionally vague. Verified Class Action Complaint at 184, Does III, No. 2:22-cv-10209 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 2, 2022).
120. Id. § 8(3), 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2247.
121. Id. § 8(3)(e).
122. See generally Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Note, Gangsters to Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and Future
of Sex Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 727, 767–78 (2013) (detailing legal challenges
to States’ sex offender laws).
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III. THE PROCEDURE DUE BEFORE MSORA APPLIES
The due process clauses of the federal 123 and Michigan 124 constitutions prohibit
the State from depriving individuals of protected liberty interests without adequate
procedural safeguards. When the State seeks to deprive an individual of a liberty
interest based on the existence of some fact, it must give that person a chance to
contest whether the fact exists. 125 In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v.
Doe, the Supreme Court held that convicted sex offenders had a chance to litigate the
sole relevant fact concerning the applicability of sex offender laws—their guilt for a
sex offense—at their criminal trials. 126
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Connecticut Department of Public Safety to
effectively foreclose procedural due process claims against MSORA because
MSORA requires registration solely based on criminal convictions. 127 State courts
have held that MSORA does not implicate procedural due process because the statute
does not infringe protected liberty interests as a matter of law under the federal and
state constitutions. 128 However, some courts have recognized due process violations
where States wrongfully classified individuals as sex offenders without an adequate
process for correcting the mistake. 129 A challenge on this ground against MSORA is
currently pending in federal court. 130
In Hart v. Hillsdale County, Anthony Hart challenged MSORA in federal court
on procedural due process grounds. 131 In 2013, Hart was registered as a sex offender
and incorrectly listed his address as 79 Budlong Street when updating his information
with law enforcement. 132 After police discovered that Hart was living at 76 Budlong
Street, he was arrested and charged with violating MSORA. 133 The following year,
Hart was arrested again after he failed to annually register and was sentenced to up
to two years in prison. 134 However, Hart had been convicted of only one listed
123. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
124. In re Wentworth, 651 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
125. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003).
126. Id. at 7–8.
127. See Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2007); Fullmer v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 360 F.3d 579, 581–82 (6th Cir. 2004); accord Doe v. Abbott, 945 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2019);
Murphy v. Rychlowski, 868 F.3d 561, 565–67 (7th Cir. 2017); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 112–13 (2d Cir.
2014); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Mileski v. Washington, 468 F. App’x 585, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that individuals convicted
of non-listed offenses are afforded the chance to contest whether their convictions fall within the scope of
MSORA’s “catch-all” listed offense provision).
128. See, e.g., People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307, 353 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 969
N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 2022) (mem.).
129. See Schepers v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 909, 914–16 (7th Cir. 2012); Brown v. Montoya,
662 F.3d 1152, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 2011); cf. Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77, 80–82 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]rongfully
classifying an inmate as a sex offender may have a stigmatizing effect which implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest.” (citations omitted)).
130. Hart v. Hillsdale Cnty., 973 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2020), remanding to No. 16-10253 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 1,
2021).
131. Id. at 643–44.
132. Id. at 633–34.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 634.
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offense as a juvenile and had been designated as a Tier II offender. 135 After the 2011
amendments, only Tier III juvenile offenders were required to register with MSORA,
so Hart was not required to register as a sex offender when he was twice arrested for
violating MSORA. 136
Hart was unaware that he was no longer required to register with MSORA when
he was arrested in 2013 and 2014. 137 The State was apparently unaware as well; law
enforcement told Hart that he was required to register and Hart was convicted for
MSORA violations years after his registration was no longer required. 138 After Hart
had served nineteen months of his sentence, the Michigan Department of Corrections
realized the error and released him. 139 Hart subsequently sued several sheriff’s department employees under title 42, section 1983 of the U.S. Code, arguing that his
wrongful inclusion in PSOR imposed stigma in violation of his liberty interests without due process. 140 Hart also sought to recover against the city and county of Hillsdale for his wrongful arrests and incarceration. 141
The district court denied the State and municipal defendants’ motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, and they appealed. 142 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit allowed
Hart’s procedural due process claim to proceed against the municipal defendants and
the county employees who published Hart’s information in the PSOR and specified
that Hart would need to identify a specific procedural flaw to prevail. 143 Hart’s
claims are currently set for trial. 144
Hart could argue that the State’s petition procedure for discontinuing registration
was inadequate. MSORA allows individuals who are no longer required to register
with MSORA to petition courts to discontinue their registration. 145 MSORA also
imposes an affirmative duty to remove individuals’ information from the public and
law enforcement databases who are no longer required to register as sex offenders. 146
The Ninth Circuit held that similar procedures insufficiently guaranteed due process, 147 but a federal district court rejected a similar claim regarding MSORA because the plaintiffs had failed to show the deprivation of a protected interest. 148
135. Id. at 633.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 633–34.
139. Id. at 634.
140. Id. at 634, 643–44. See generally Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–10 (1976) (articulating the “stigmaplus” test for procedural due process claims upon which Hart relied).
141. . Hart, 973 F.3d at 645. The plaintiff sought to recover on a theory of municipal liability under Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id.
142. Hart, 973 F.3d at 634.
143. Id. at 645–46.
144. . Scheduling Order, Hart, No. 16-10253 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 7, 2021).
145. . MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.728c(15)(b) (West 2020).
146. Id. § 28.728(9).
147. See Humphries v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184–1201 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other
grounds, 562 U.S. 29 (2010); accord Collier v. Buckner, 303 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1265–71 (M.D. Ala. 2018)
(holding that the plaintiffs stated colorable claims for procedural due process violations).
148. Akella v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 731–32 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that
plaintiffs whose address was wrongfully listed in the PSOR had failed to properly allege the deprivation of a
protected liberty interest).
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In any case, punishing individuals for failing to comply with MSORA who are
not required to register as sex offenders serves no legitimate public safety purpose
and exposes municipalities and state employees to liability. The Michigan legislature
should require law enforcement to identify individuals who are currently complying
with MSORA or whose information is listed in the public or law enforcement registries that are not required to register as sex offenders. The State should notify those
individuals that their registration is no longer required and purge their information
from its records. Placing the onus on private citizens to learn that their registration
is no longer required and petition courts to recognize that fact does nothing to protect
the public from supposedly dangerous sex offenders.
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY: THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
When plaintiffs challenge laws under the federal 149 or Michigan 150 constitutions’
equal protection and due process clauses, courts apply strict scrutiny if the law infringes on fundamental rights. In equal protection cases, plaintiffs must also allege
that they are a member of a class treated differently than some other group of people. 151 Sex offenders can accomplish this easily enough because they are necessarily
members of a class of sex offenders. However, locating a fundamental interest has
proven more difficult.
Under the strict scrutiny standard, laws that infringe on fundamental rights must
be “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 152 Courts treat the federal
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as protective against infringements upon
the same bundle of rights when evaluating challenges to MSORA. 153 In the equal
protection context, courts also apply strict scrutiny to laws that discriminate against
protected classes. 154
Courts will apply rational basis review to laws that do not infringe on fundamental rights or discriminate against a protected class in equal protection 155 and substantive due process cases. 156 To pass the rational basis test, a law must be “rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.” 157
No court has ever held that MSORA discriminates against a protected class or
infringes on fundamental rights in an equal protection or due process challenge, so

149. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (equal protection); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (due process).
150. Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Mich. 2004) (equal protection); Morreale v. Dep’t of
Comm. Health, 726 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (due process).
151. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439; People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307, 354 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (state law),
rev’d on other grounds, 969 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 2022) (mem.).
152. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
153. See, e.g., Doe v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs’ failures to show
that MSORA deprived them of any fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause was dispositive of whether
the plaintiffs had properly shown the deprivation of a fundamental rights under the Equal Protection Clause).
154. See, e.g., Akella v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 731–32 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
155. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; People vIdziak, 773 N.W.2d 616, 628 (Mich. 2009) (state law).
156. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997); Morreale v. Dep’t of Comm. Health, 726
N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
157. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439.
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no court has ever applied strict scrutiny to MSORA in an equal protection or due
process case. Courts have held that Michigan sex offenders generally 158 and subclasses of Michigan sex offenders 159 do not constitute protected classes. Courts have
also rejected claims that MSORA violates fundamental rights, 160 including the rights
to travel, 161 obtain employment, 162 keep one’s information private, 163 and more. 164
Claims that MSORA violates registrants’ privacy rights deserve special attention
given the frequency with which courts have addressed such challenges.
A.

Sex Offenders’ Privacy: An Oxymoron

The Supreme Court has recognized constitutionally protected privacy interests
in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and in “independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions.” 165 Concerning the first strand of protected privacy
interests, courts have repeatedly held that MSORA registrants have no protected interests in preventing the State from publishing their publicly available information in
the PSOR. 166 Even where MSORA discloses registrants’ otherwise private

158. Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Haddad v. Fromson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1085,
1094 (W.D. Mich. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002); accord Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 482 (6th Cir. 1999); Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d
1347, 1353 (10th Cir. 2017); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay,
260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).
159. See Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007) (pre-2004 HYTA offenders
under MSORA); accord U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) (juveniles); Moore, 410 F.3d
at 1346 (multiple categories); Artway v. Att’y Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (repetitive and compulsive sex offenders).
160. State courts have held that MSORA violates no fundamental rights protected by state law. See, e.g.,
People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307, 354 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 969 N.W.2d 55 (Mich.
2022) (mem.); cf. Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 1174, 1185 (10th Cir. 2020) (“The Appellees fail to show how
[Colorado’s Sex Offender Registration Act] violated their fundamental rights.”).
161. Does I, 932 F. Supp. 2d 803, 814–17 (E.D. Mich. 2013), rev’d, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016); accord
Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 525–28 (7th Cir. 2021); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 114
& n.5 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432
(2012); Prynne v. Settle, 848 F. App’x 93, 103–04 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Byrd, 419 F. App’x 485,
491–92 (5th Cir. 2011).
162. Does I, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 817–18; accord Prynne, 848 F. App’x at 104.
163. See infra Section IV.A.
164. See Mileski v. Washington, 468 F. App’x 585, 587 (6th Cir. 2012) (right to be free from registration
requirements following a conviction for a listed offense lacking a sexual element); see also Vasquez v. Foxx,
895 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting violation of right to establish home claim); Moore, 410 F.3d at
1344–45 (rejecting violation of right to refuse sex offender registration and prevent public dissemination of
information claims); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting violation of right to be free
from sex offender registration and notification requirements claims); Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643
(8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting presumption of innocence claim).
165. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
166. Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112
(W.D. Mich. 1997); In re Wentworth, 651 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam); accord Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The Constitution does not provide Cutshall with a right
to keep his registry information private . . . .”); Cuomo, 755 F.3d at 114; Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079,
1093–94 (9th Cir. 1997); Prynne, 848 F. App’x at 105; see also Willman v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 819, 825 (6th
Cir. 2020) (rejecting claim that the publication of the plaintiff’s information in Michigan’s PSOR violated a
First Amendment privacy right); In re Whittaker, 607 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
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information, courts hold that the State’s interest in preventing future sex crimes outweighs registrants’ privacy interests. 167
The Does I plaintiffs challenged MSORA under the second strand of substantive
due process privacy claims, arguing that MORA’s student safety zones violated their
rights to participate in the education and upbringing of their children. 168 Judge Cleland did not reach this privacy claim, 169 and it was mooted when MSORA’s student
safety zones were repealed, but other circuits have rejected similar claims. 170 Given
courts’ consistent refusals to hold that MSORA infringes on fundamental rights and
the removal of the student safety provisions from MSORA, courts are unlikely to
subject MSORA to strict scrutiny and will evaluate the statute under rational basis
review. Part VI discusses whether MSORA passes the rational basis test.
V. BILL OF ATTAINDER, DUE PROCESS, EX POST FACTO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, AND
CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES
Challenges to MSORA brought under several constitutional provisions, namely
the federal and Michigan bill of attainder, ex post facto, double jeopardy, and cruel
and unusual punishment clauses, effectively amount to claims that the statute imposes
unlawful punishment. 171
A.

The Bill of Attainder Clause

The bill of attainder clauses of the federal 172 and Michigan 173 constitutions prevent the State from passing laws punishing anyone without a judicial trial or

MSORA did not deny parents of sex offender with whom sex offender lived equal protection by requiring that
the parents’ address be listed in the PSOR).
167. Doe v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 964–66 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that Michigan may disclose individuals’
information whose convictions for listed offenses were subsequently set aside by court orders); Doe v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 500–01 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that Michigan may disclose HYTA offenders’ information even where those offenders pled guilty in exchange for their information being kept private); accord A.A. ex rel. M.M. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206, 210–14 (3d Cir. 2003); Prynne, 848 F. App’x 93
at 104–05.
168. See Does I, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672, 696–99 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
169. Id. at 44 (holding that it was impossible to tell whether MSORA’s student safety provisions violated
the plaintiffs’ rights because the contested provisions were unconstitutionally vague).
170. See Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting violation of
right to reside with family members); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709–11 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting violation
of right to personal choices regarding the family); Paul P. v. Vernerio, 170 F.3d 396, 404–405 (3d Cir. 1999)
(rejecting violation of interest in family relationships); Prynne, 848 F. App’x at 104–05 (rejecting violation of
right to have biological children).
171. See Jane Ramage, Note, Reframing the Punishment Test Through Modern Sex Offender Legislation,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2019).
172. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1344 (2d ed. Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851).
173. City of Detroit v. Div. 26 of Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps., 51 N.W.2d
228, 232 (Mich. 1952).
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conviction. The Supreme Court has invalidated five laws as bills of attainder, 174 each
of which targeted political groups engaged in allegedly subversive activities. 175
The English Parliament attainted those suspected of disloyalty to the Crown, 176
so the Court’s bill of attainder jurisprudence tracks with an originalist understanding
of attainder. Sex offenders are not a political class, so MSORA is not a bill of attainder within an originalist framework.
A purposive approach to attainder also cuts against interpreting MSORA as a bill
of attainder. The talisman of attainder is punishment purposefully imposed, 177 and
both federal 178 and state 179 courts have repeatedly held that the Michigan legislature
did not enact MSORA to punish sex offenders. 180 Rather, the legislature enacted
MSORA to protect public safety, so MSORA was not enacted with the intent to attain
sex offenders.
In any case, the federal and state ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses adequately protect against attainder because those clauses effectively prohibit the Michigan legislature from subjecting registrants to the same obligations as the federal and
state bill of attainder clauses ostensibly would. 181 Further, Michigan’s two federal
district courts held that MSORA was not a bill of attainder. 182 Federal precedent and
the history of the federal Bill of Attainder Clause indicate that courts will decline to
hold that MSORA’s restrictions and obligations constitute attainder under either federal or state law. 183

174. Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 1203, 1229 (2010).
175. See U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (communists and labor unionists); U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946) (law targeting communists); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. 234 (1872) (law targeting ex-Confederates); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 33 (1866) (same); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866) (same).
176. Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 473–74 (1977).
177. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 326–27 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
178. E.g., Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d 696, 700–01 (6th Cir. 2016).
179. E.g., People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497, 507–09 (Mich. 2021).
180. See also 57 C.J.S. Mental Health § 280 (2018) (“A sexual offender registration act does not adjudicate
guilt nor inflict punishment, and thus, it may not constitute a bill of attainder.” (footnote omitted)).
181. See infra Part IV (discussing how the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of the federal and
Michigan constitutions protect convicted sex offenders from being punished except as a sentence for their sex
crimes).
182. Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 854–55 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1108–
12 (W.D. Mich. 1997); accord Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Farwell, 999
F. Supp. 174, 193 (D. Mass. 1998).
183. But see Joel A. Sherwin, Are Bills of Attainder the New Currency? Challenging the Constitutionality
of Sex Offender Regulations that Inflict Punishment Without the “Safeguard of a Judicial Trial”, 37 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 1301 (2010) (arguing that punitive sex offender laws are bills of attainder).
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The Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and Cruel & Unusual Punishment
Clauses

The double jeopardy, ex post facto, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of
the federal 184 and Michigan 185 constitutions prohibit the State from punishing individuals twice for the same conduct, increasing individuals’ punishments for crimes
after they have already been sentenced, and imposing punishment that is cruel and
unusual, respectively. Until Does I Appeal, almost every other federal circuit
court, 186 including prior Sixth Circuit panels, 187 that have considered whether a state
sex offender registration law imposes unconstitutional punishment have held that it
does not. 188 Michigan state courts also routinely rejected claims that MSORA

184. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798) (ex post facto); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 174 (1873) (double
jeopardy); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666–67 (1977) (cruel and unusual punishment).
185. People v. Earl, 845 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Mich. 2014) (ex post facto); People v. Torres, 549 N.W.2d 540,
549 (Mich. 1996) (double jeopardy); People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Mich. 1992) (cruel or unusual
punishment).
186. Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 530–34 (7th Cir. 2021); Doe v. Abbott, 945 F.3d
307, 313–15 (5th Cir. 2019); Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018); Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556 (10th
Cir. 2016); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 109–12 (2d Cir. 2014); Am. C.L. Union v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046,
1052–58 (9th Cir. 2012); Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Miller,
405 F.3d 700, 718–23 (8th Cir. 2005); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 961–67 (9th Cir. 2004); Moore v.
Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 872–73 (5th Cir. 2001); Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052, 1053–55 (8th Cir.
2000); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1248–54 (10th Cir. 2000); Roe v. Off. of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d 47,
52–55 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272–85 (2d Cir. 1997); E.B. v. Vernerio, 119 F.3d 1077,
1092–1105 (3d Cir. 1997); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1083–93 (9th Cir. 1997); Artway v. Att’y Gen.,
81 F.3d 1235, 1253–67 (3d Cir. 1996); Windwalker v. Governor of Ala., 579 F. App’x 769, 771–73 (11th Cir.
2014); Johnson v. Terhune, 184 F. App’x 622, 624 (9th Cir. 2006).
But cf. Prynne v. Settle, 848 F. App’x 93, 101–03 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that a plaintiff stated a colorable claim
that state sex offender registration statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause); Doe v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 846
F.3d 1180, 1183–86 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that a plaintiff stated a colorable claim that state sex offender
registration statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause with respect to a county ordinance), remanded to No. 1:14cv-23933-PCH, 2018 WL 10780510 (Dec. 18, 2018) (holding that county’s sex offender residency restriction
was rationally related to public safety).
187. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1003–07 (6th Cir. 2007); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 476–77
(6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 490–92 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that
federal sex offender registration statute did not impose punishment).
188. A notable exception is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Otte I, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), which
was reversed by the Supreme Court in Smith.

2022]

Sex Offender Legislation Ex Post Facto

319

punished, until Betts. 189 However, other state supreme courts have held that their
States’ sex offender registration laws punish ex post facto. 190
1.

Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, and Cruel & Unusual Punishment
Distinguished

In the context of sex offender registration laws, the federal and state double jeopardy clauses are more protective than the federal and state ex post facto clauses, and
the cruel and unusual punishment clauses are moot. This is true because anyone
convicted of a sex crime has faced some legal punishment. Therefore, punitive sex
offender registration laws that apply to individuals who have already been convicted
of sex crimes violate the federal and state double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses
because such laws impose duplicative and retroactive punishment. Moreover, punitive sex offender registration laws that only prospectively apply to individuals convicted of sex crimes will violate the federal and state double jeopardy clauses once
any sex offender is subject to them. However, such laws do not impose punishment
ex post facto. As such, the federal and state double jeopardy clauses prohibit prospective and retroactive punitive sex offender registration laws, while the federal and
state ex post facto clauses prevent only the latter. At bottom, Michigan may not enact
an ostensibly civil regime to punish sex offenders, regardless of whether the punishment is cruel and unusual. 191

189. People v. Golba, 729 N.W.2d 916, 924–27 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting claim that MSORA is
punitive under federal law).
For cases holding that MSORA is not punitive under federal and state law, see People v. Patton, 925 N.W.2d
901, 909–14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018); People v. Tucker, 879 N.W.2d 906, 911–26 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (per
curiam); People v. Costner, 870 N.W.2d 582, 588–90 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Pennington, 610 N.W.2d
608, 609–13 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam); People v. Temelkoski, 859 N.W.2d 743, 750–61 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2014) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 905 N.W.2d 593 (Mich. 2018); and People v. Snyder, No.
325449, 2016 WL 683206, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2016) (per curiam), rev’d, 964 N.W.2d 594 (Mich.
2021) (mem.).
For cases holding that MSORA is not punitive under state law, see People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307, 351–52
(Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d, 969 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 2022) (mem.); People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 887–
89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); In re TD, 823 N.W.2d 101, 105–10 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011), vacating as moot 821
N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012); and In re Ayres, 608 N.W.2d 132, 134–39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), superseded by
statute, Act of June 28, 1999, Pub. Act No. 85, § 8(2), 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 271, 279–80. But see also infra
note 191 (discussing the sole state case holding that MSORA imposed cruel and unusual punishment).
190. See Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1090–1100 (N.H. 2015); State v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004,
1017–31 (Okla. 2013); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377–84 (Ind. 2009); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145,
1148–54 (Ind. 2009); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 442–47 (Ky. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d
4, 12–26 (Me. 2009); Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 191–97 (Mass. 2009); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d
999, 1007–19 (Alaska 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1198, 1208–22 (Penn. 2017) (challenge to federal sex offender registration laws). For an evaluation of these courts’ holdings concerning the
challenged sex offender statutes’ rational relationships to legitimate purposes, see infra note 273 and accompanying text.
191. There was one successful MSORA challenge brought under the cruel or unusual punishment clause of
the Michigan Constitution in People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). Dipiazza was decided
when MSORA still required pre-2004 HYTA offenders to register regardless of whether they successfully completed their HYTA requirements, and their convictions were dismissed. Id. The defendant in Dipiazza was
convicted of a listed offense and assigned HYTA status before October 2004. Id. at 266. The defendant successfully completed his HYTA requirements, and his conviction was dismissed, but he was still required to
register as a sex offender for twenty-five years. Id. The trial court reduced the defendant’s registration period
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The federal and state ex post facto clauses also seem irrelevant at first blush, but
successful ex post facto challenges may be more powerful than successful double
jeopardy challenges. The federal and state double jeopardy clauses protect against
retroactive and prospective punishment while the ex post facto clauses prevent only
retroactive punishment, so successful ex post facto challenges may be more powerful
than successful double jeopardy challenges. For example, it is unclear whether Judge
Cleland in Does II would have voided the public laws containing 2011 amendments
in toto if the plaintiffs had raised a double jeopardy challenge and not an ex post facto
challenge.
Courts may apply different remedies to laws that violate the ex post facto clauses
than those which place individuals in double jeopardy. The ex post facto clauses
prohibit ex post facto laws, 192 so it follows that courts will enjoin States from enforcing laws imposing any retroactive punishment in their entirety. In contrast, the double jeopardy clauses prohibit punishment in the abstract, 193 so it is possible that in
Does II, Judge Cleland would not have enjoined enforcement of the public laws containing the 2006 and 2011 amendments but rather only the problematic provisions
themselves. In any case, the substantive inquiry in both double jeopardy and ex post
facto cases is whether MSORA imposes punishment.
2.

The Intent-Effects Test

Courts apply the “intent-effects” test to determine whether statutes impose retroactive punishment in violation of the state 194 and federal 195 ex post facto clauses or
duplicative punishment prohibited by the double jeopardy clauses. Under the intent
prong of the intent-effects test, courts ask whether the legislature enacted the law to
punish. 196 If the legislature intended the law to be punitive, then it imposes punishment and may not be applied to individuals for conduct (1) that occurred before the
law was passed (ex post facto); or (2) for which individuals have already been punished (double jeopardy). 197 If the legislature instead passed a law to create a civil
regime, courts determine whether the law’s effects render it punitive nonetheless. 198
Even Does I Appeal 199 and Betts 200 agreed that the Michigan legislature did not enact
to ten years. Id. The court of appeals held that requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender was punishment that was cruel and unusual. Id. at 268, 273–74. However, the defendant in Dipiazza could have just as
easily challenged his registration period under the double jeopardy clause of the Michigan constitution.
192. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.” (emphasis added)); MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No . . . ex post facto law . . . shall be enacted.” (emphasis added)).
193. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“No person shall be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy.”).
194. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92–97 (2003).
195. See, e.g., People v. Earl, 845 N.W.2d 721, 728 (Mich. 2014) (ex post facto clause); McClelland v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, No. 323875, 2016 WL 155869, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2016) (per curiam) (double
jeopardy clause).
196. Porte, supra note 1, at 727.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 728.
199. 834 F.3d 696, 700–01 (6th Cir. 2016).
200. 968 N.W.2d 497, 507–08 (Mich. 2021).
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MSORA to punish sex offenders, so courts will focus on the effects prong of the
intent-effects test in future challenges to the statute.
Courts examine the factors detailed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza Martinez 201 to determine whether a law is effectively punitive. 202 The Mendoza-Martinez factors include whether the law: (1) imposes what has historically
been regarded as punishment; (2) imposes affirmative disability or restraint; (3) promotes the traditional aims of punishment; (4) advances legitimate, nonpunitive purposes; and (5) is excessive in relation to its legitimate purpose. 203 In Smith v. Doe,
the Supreme Court applied the intent-effects test and held that Alaska’s Sex Offender
Registration Act (“ASORA”) did not impose punishment. 204
ASORA was similar to MSORA in many respects. 205 For example, ASORA required all sex offenders to register with law enforcement for either fifteen years or
for life, depending on the severity of their offenses. 206 Upon initial registration, registrants were required to provide law enforcement with, among other things, their
names, addresses, employers, birth dates, driver’s license numbers, and a description
of any car they “ha[d] access to regardless of whether that access is regular or not.” 207
This information, along with registrants’ photographs, was published in an online
database. 208 Alaska registrants were also subject to periodic and immediate reporting
requirements. 209 However, unlike the old MSORA, ASORA’s reporting requirements were not necessarily in-person; registrants could notify law enforcement in
writing. 210 The Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court applied the same analysis as Smith in Does I Appeal and Betts and held that MSORA imposed punishment. 211
a.

Resemblance to Traditional Forms of Punishment

Concerning the first Mendoza-Martinez factor, the Supreme Court in Smith rejected the respondent’s arguments that ASORA’s obligations resembled traditional
forms of punishment. 212 Smith held that ASORA’s obligations did not resemble
whipping, pillory, or branding because they imposed no physical pain. 213 The Court
also held that Alaska’s online registry did not resemble public shaming, humiliation,
or banishment because it merely disseminated truthful information already available

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 105–06.
See id. at 89–92.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.020 (2018).
Id. § 12.63.010 (2006).
Id. § 18.65.087 (2004).
See id.
Id.
See Porte, supra note 1, at 733–36.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97–99 (2003).
Id. at 97–98.
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to the public. 214 Any negative effects stemming from the public availability of registrants’ information were “but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation.” 215
Does I Appeal and Betts easily distinguished MSORA from ASORA. For example, both courts agreed that MSORA’s student safety zone restrictions resembled
banishment and parole. 216 Additionally, Michigan’s PSOR went further than
Alaska’s by listing registrants’ tier designations, which, according to the Sixth Circuit, shamed registrants by listing their presumed dangerousness without any measure
of their actual dangerousness. 217 The Sixth Circuit also noted that pre-October 2004
HYTA sex offenders’ information was listed in the public registry when, in the absence of MSORA, their records would have been sealed if they had completed their
HYTA requirements. 218 Both courts also held that MSORA’s in-person reporting
requirements resembled parole because they enabled law enforcement to constantly
monitor registered sex offenders. 219
b.

Affirmative Disability or Restraint

In Smith, Justice Kennedy concluded that the second Mendoza-Martinez factor
weighed against finding that ASORA was punitive. 220 The Court reasoned that
ASORA’s ongoing reporting requirements did not impose affirmative disability because they left offenders free to change jobs or residences; offenders were required
only to report those changes to law enforcement. 221 However, the Court did not address whether the lower court’s erroneous assumption that ASORA’s reporting requirements were in-person would have, if accurate, changed the affirmative disability
calculus. 222
Does I Appeal and Betts both held that multiple provisions of MSORA imposed
affirmative disability or restraint. Specifically, both courts detailed that MSORA’s
in-person reporting requirements disabled registrants from engaging in various activities without reporting them to police, and MSORA’s student safety provisions imposed obvious restraints. 223
c.

Furtherance of the Goals of Punishment

In Smith, the State conceded the third Mendoza-Martinez factor and agreed with
the respondents that ASORA may deter crime, but the Court held that this did not

214. Id. at 98.
215. Id. at 99.
216. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d 696, 701–03 (6th Cir. 2016); People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497, 507–10 (Mich.
2021).
217. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 702–03. Contra Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 528 (Viviano, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[T]he publication of the registrant’s tier classification is not a punishment.”).
218. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 702–03.
219. Id.; Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 509–10.
220. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 101.
223. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 703; Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 510–12.
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weigh heavily in favor of holding that ASORA was punitive. 224 The Court also held
that even if Alaska’s lifetime-registration periods implied that Alaska had retributively imposed more serious restrictions on offenders who had committed more serious crimes, the State’s disparate registration periods were rationally connected to future dangerousness and were not punitive. 225
Like Alaska in Smith, Michigan conceded that MSORA deterred sex crimes in
Does I Appeal 226 and Betts. 227 Both courts articulated that MSORA was retributive
because offenders’ crimes of convictions, as opposed to individualized assessments
of dangerousness, controlled whether Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III restrictions applied. 228
The Sixth Circuit also reasoned that MSORA incapacitated registrants by reducing
opportunities to re-offend. 229
d.

Rational Connection to Nonpunitive Purpose

The Supreme Court has declared that the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor, rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, was the most significant. 230 In Smith, the
parties conceded that ASORA legitimately furthered public safety. 231 In Betts, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that MSORA furthered the same legitimate interest,
“given the low bar of rationality.” 232 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit questioned the
efficacy of sex offender registration schemes in general, pointing to studies concluding that sex offender registration statutes are at best ineffective and, at worst, actually
increase the risk of recidivism among registrants. 233
e.

Scope with Respect to Legitimate Purpose

The Smith litigants argued that although ASORA was rationally related to public
safety, its provisions were overbroad. 234 The Court disagreed, holding that even if
ASORA was not narrowly drawn, any imprecision did not “suggest that the Act’s
nonpunitive purpose [was] a ‘sham or mere pretext.’” 235 The Court reasoned that
Alaska could rationally legislate sex offenders as a class without individualized assessments of risk given the “frightening and high” recidivism rates reportedly present

224. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102. Justice Kennedy wrote that any deterrent effect caused by the statute was
merely ancillary to its legitimate purpose. Id.
225. Id.
226. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 704.
227. Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 512.
228. See Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 704; Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 512. Contra Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 528
(Viviano, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I cannot see how the lack of [individualized risk assessments] and the reliance on the convicted offense constitutes a punishment.”).
229. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 704.
230. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
231. Id. at 103.
232. Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 513.
233. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 704–05.
234. Smith, 538 U.S. at 103.
235. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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among all sex offenders. 236 Alaska’s fifteen-year and lifetime reporting periods were
also not found to be excessive in light of the length of time during which sex offenders are likely to re-offend. 237 Finally, Alaska’s online registry was permissible
“[g]iven the general mobility of our population.” 238
In contrast, Does I Appeal 239 and Betts 240 held that MSORA’s student-safety
zones, in-person reporting requirements, and separation of offenders into tiers without individualized risk assessments were excessive concerning the statute’s questionably legitimate purpose. The Michigan Supreme Court also doubted whether the
length of MSORA’s registration periods was necessary. 241 Considering the aggregate weight of all five Mendoza-Martinez factors, both courts held that MSORA was
an ex post facto law. 242 The next Section applies the Does I Appeal and Smith analyses to the new MSORA to determine whether the statute is still an ex post facto law.
3.

The New MSORA Under the Intent-Effects Test

The Michigan legislature removed some of the provisions from MSORA that the
Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court took issue with and amended others. 243 The removal of MSORA’s student-safety provisions and registrants’ tiers
from the PSOR ostensibly reduces the punitive effect of the new MSORA. However,
local police stations now may allow registrants to report remotely. 244 The Michigan
legislature should explicitly allow remote reporting, or else registrants whose local
police posts continue to require in-person reporting could successfully challenge
MSORA. The State did not address MSORA’s tier system, but the Sixth Circuit’s
and the Michigan Supreme Court’s objections to MSORA’s lack of individualized
risk assessments do not comport with well-established precedent as a matter of logic.
The courts’ conclusions that MSORA’s lack of individualized risk assessments
renders the statute punitive is but another way of saying that Michigan may not regulate sex offenders as a class, a view which Smith explicitly rejected. 245 The Supreme
Court endorsed Alaska’s two-tiered system 246 while Does I Appeal and Betts rejected

236. Id. (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)); see also Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman,
“Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 495, 499 (2015) (“[T]he evidence for McKune’s claim that offenders have high recidivism
rates . . . was just the unsupported assertion of someone without research expertise who made his living selling
[sex offender] counseling programs to prisons.” (footnote omitted)).
237. Smith, 538 U.S. at 104.
238. Id. at 105.
239. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016).
240. 968 N.W.2d 497, 512–15 (Mich. 2021).
241. Id. at 514.
242. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 705; Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 515.
243. See supra Section II.D.
244. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.725 (West Supp. 2021).
245. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 87 (2003) (“The State’s determination to legislate with respect to convicted
sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not render the
Act punitive.”
(citations omitted)).
246. Id. at 84. See generally text accompanying supra note 206 (detailing ASORA’s fifteen-year and lifetime registration periods, which effectively created a two-tiered registration scheme).

2022]

Sex Offender Legislation Ex Post Facto

325

Michigan’s three-tiered system. 247 Neither Sixth Circuit in Does I Appeal nor the
Michigan Supreme Court in Betts addressed why the latter is permissible while the
former is not.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s procedural due process jurisprudence in the sex offender registration law context also illustrates the issues with the courts’ views.
States may permissibly impose implications based solely on a criminal conviction,
and such obligations are not necessarily punitive merely because a criminal conviction is a condition precedent to their application. 248 If States have the power to regulate sex offenders as a class, it defies logic to say that States impose unconstitutional
punishment whenever they exercise that power.
The courts’ concerns with MSORA’s lack of individualized risk assessments
were more likely an expression of the courts’ dissatisfaction with the obligations and
restrictions that the State categorically imposed. 249 Consequently, whether the new
MSORA is an ex post facto law is likely controlled by the fourth and most important
Mendoza-Martinez factor: rational connection to a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose. 250 However, it is also possible that federal courts could apply the Sixth Circuit’s line of cases holding that federal sex offender legislation does not punish ex
post facto to MSORA. To understand whether these holding could be applied to
MSORA, it is necessary to discuss the current federal sex offender registration
scheme.
4.

Ex Post Facto Challenges to Federal Sex Offender Registration Laws

Challenges to federal sex offender legislation first arose after Congress passed
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) in 2006, which took
effect in 2010. 251 SORNA requires sex offenders to comply with the registration
247. Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d at 705; Betts, 968 N.W.2d at 515. The Does III plaintiffs argue that MSORA’s
lack of individualized review and the inability of Tier II and Tier III offenders to petition to end their registration
periods. Verified Class Action Complaint at 169–76, Does III, No. 2:22-cv-10209 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2022).
If states may prescribe different registration requirements based on registrants’ perceived dangerousness, Michigan may restrict more dangerous offenders from petitioning to end their registration periods. The Does III
plaintiffs’ demand for individualized review should be rejected on the strength of Smith as well, though the
courts’ opinions in Does I Appeal and Betts cast doubt on whether either of the Does III plaintiffs’ claims
discussed will be dismissed.
248. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
249. Ironically, before the 2011 amendments, scholars argued that adopting a three-tiered registration system would make MSORA less punitive. See Kari Melkonian, Note, Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act:
Does It Make Communities Safer? The Implications of the Inclusion of a Broad Range of Offenders, a Review
of Statutory Amendments and Thoughts on Future Changes, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 355, 378–80 (2007);
Mark E. Rath, Michigan’s Scarlet Letter Laws: Are Changes in Order?, 15 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 291,
314 (1995).
250. The language used by the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court implied that both courts are
willing to overturn MSORA on the grounds that it is not rationally related to a public safety purpose. Does I
Appeal, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he record before us provides scant support for the proposition
that [M]SORA in fact accomplishes its professed goals.”); People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497, 514 (Mich. 2021)
(“For our limited purpose in examining the potential excessiveness of the 2011 SORA in regard to its publicsafety purpose, . . . the 2011 SORA’s efficacy is unclear.”
(footnote omitted)).
251. See United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20962
(2018 Supp. II)).
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obligations prescribed by the Act 252—obligations that, since their enactment, essentially mirror the obligations in the new MSORA. 253 However, SORNA applies to all
sex offenders as defined by federal law regardless of when they were convicted, 254
meaning that some sex offenders that are not required to register under Michigan law
are still required to register with Michigan law enforcement under federal law. 255
In United States v. Felts, an individual required to register as a sex offender in
Tennessee under SORNA but who was not required to register under state law challenged SORNA in federal court in 2010. 256 The plaintiff had been convicted of a sex
crime in 1994, 257 and Tennessee’s registration requirement only applied to sex offenders convicted after January 1, 1996. 258 The plaintiff argued that SORNA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by requiring him to register as a sex offender for the
first time nearly twenty years after his conviction. 259 The Sixth Circuit eschewed the
Mendoza-Martinez analysis and found instead that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith was dispositive. 260 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit held that SORNA did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 261
Felts ought to have controlled Does I Appeal, at least in part. The Sixth Circuit
ostensibly disagreed, as the court did not discuss Felts—or any other SORNA
cases—in Does I Appeal. 262 This may reflect a broader trend that courts will not
consider SORNA cases when considering constitutional challenges to state sex offender registration laws, even if the underlying obligations are identical. This trend
was repeated more recently in Willman v. Attorney General, where an individual convicted of a listed offense in Michigan before September 1995 challenged SORNA
under the Ex Post Facto Clause in 2019. 263
In Willman, The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s Ex Post Facto claim was
controlled by Felts, a decision with which more recent circuit court decisions were

SORNA replaced the Jacob Wetterling Act, which had prescribed minimum guidelines for state sex offender
registries and conditioned the receipt of federal funding to law enforcement agencies on states’ compliance with
minimum guidelines. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, §
170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038–42, repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-248, § 129, 120 Stat. 587, 600. SORNA retains these obligations on the States in addition to obligations
imposed on sex offenders. See 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20962.
252. Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 434 (2012).
253. See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030,
38,054–58, 38,062–69 (July 2, 2008); see also Registration Requirements Under the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 69,856, 69,884–87 (Dec. 8, 2021) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72) (current
SORNA guidelines).
254. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 69,867–69 (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72.3).
255. See Willman v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1269 (2021)
(mem.).
256. United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 602 (6th Cir. 2012).
257. Id.
258. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-703(3)(A) (2021).
259. Felts, 674 F.3d at 605–06.
260. See id. at 606.
261. Id.
262. 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016).
263. 972 F.3d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 2020).
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in accord. 264 Willman relegated its discussion of Does I Appeal to a footnote, where
the Sixth Circuit noted that “[i]n that case, we determined that [MSORA] was an
unconstitutional ex post facto law because it was retroactive, and its stringent restrictions (such as severe limits on where sex offenders were allowed to live and
work) constituted punishment.” 265
Willman’s characterization of Does I Appeal implies that the old MSORA imposed punishment ex post facto because of its residency restrictions. If this is true,
the new MSORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, like Felts,
Willman also did not apply a Mendoza-Martinez analysis. 266 Given the Sixth Circuit’s trend of not discussing SORNA cases in the context of challenges to state sex
offender registration laws and vice-versa, it is unclear whether federal courts will
apply Willman’s SORNA analysis to the new MSORA. Last, even if Willman controls whether the new MSORA violates the federal constitution, Willman will not
control a state court’s decision concerning the constitutionality of MSORA under
state law. 267 Consequently, whether MSORA has a rational connection to a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose will still likely control whether the statute punishes ex
post facto.
VI. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW: THE EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS, AND EX
POST FACTO CLAUSES
The rational basis test is effectively the same concerning equal protection, substantive due process, and ex post facto challenges to sex offender registration laws in
federal 268 and Michigan 269 courts: rational connection to a legitimate government
purpose. The Mendoza-Martinez factor concerning nonpunitive legitimate government interest applicable to ex post facto challenges will be the same as the interest in
equal protection and substantive due process cases: public safety. Prior to Does I
Appeal and Betts, federal and state precedent uniformly held that MSORA was rationally related to public safety.

264. Id. at 824–25. Only one of the cases cited by Willman, United States v. Wass, 954 F.3d 184 (4th Cir.
2020), was decided after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Does I Appeal. See Willman, 972 F.3d at 824–25.
265. Willman, 972 F.3d at 822 n.1.
266. See id. at 824–25.
267. People v. Gillam, 734 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Mich. 2007) (“[E]ven when there is no conflict among the
lower federal courts, we are free to follow or reject their authority.”).
268. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (equal protection); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (substantive due process); see supra Section V.B.2.d (ex post
facto).
269. Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Mich. 2004) (equal protection); Morreale v. Dep’t of
Comm. Health, 726 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (substantive due process); see supra Section
V.B.2.d (ex post facto).
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Courts have held in the equal protection, 270 substantive due process, 271 and ex
post facto 272 contexts that MSORA rationally furthered public safety. Moreover,
among the States whose supreme courts invalidated their sex offender registration
regimes as ex post facto laws, the state supreme courts all held that the challenged
sex offender laws were rationally related to a legitimate purpose when those laws
contained no residency restrictions. 273 Registrants have claimed that MSORA’s registration requirements lack a rational basis generally, and have also claimed that certain provisions lack a rational basis when applied retroactively.
1.

Rational Basis for Applying MSORA Retroactively

Retroactive laws raise different concerns than prospective laws because retroactive laws may implicate individuals’ “interests of fair notice and repose,” and thereby
offend due process. 274 In Does I, the plaintiffs argued that MSORA offended due
process by retroactively requiring one of the plaintiffs to register as a sex offender
when his non-sexual crime of conviction was added to MSORA as a listed offense
after his conviction and by retroactively extending the length of the other plaintiffs’
registration periods. 275 The plaintiffs also argued that the notice interests of offenders who had pled guilty to listed offenses when MSORA imposed different requirements and shorter registration periods were implicated because those offenders may
not have pled guilty if they had known their registration obligations would change in
the future. 276
Concerning the plaintiffs’ plea bargain claim, Judge Cleland held that even if the
state had retroactively altered the plaintiffs’ plea agreements, rational basis review
was still proper. 277 In Judge Cleland’s view, the state’s legitimate public safety interest justified monitoring sex offenders, regardless of when their convictions

270. See Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Haddad v. Fromson, 154 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1094–96 (W.D. Mich. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613
(2002).
271. See Doe v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d
491, 501 (6th Cir. 2007); Akella v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 733 (E.D. Mich. 1999);
People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307, 354–56 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (state law challenge), rev’d on other grounds,
969 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 2022) (mem.); In re TD, 823 N.W.2d 101, 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (same), vacating
as moot 821 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012).
272. See Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1997); People v. Patton, 925 N.W.2d 901,
913 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (state law challenge); People v. Tucker, 879 N.W.2d 906, 917, 924 (Mich. Ct. App.
2015) (per curiam) (federal and state law challenge); People v. Temelkoski, 859 N.W.2d 759–61 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2014) (per curiam) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 859 N.W.2d 743 (Mich. 2018).
273. See Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1099–1100 (N.H. 2015); State v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004,
1028 (Okla. 2013); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383 (Ind. 2009); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1152–
53 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 22 (Me. 2009); Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 197
(Mass. 2009); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1016 (Alaska 2008); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1198,
1216–17 (Penn. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Ky. 2009) (holding that Kentucky’s sex offender residency restrictions were not rationally related to public safety).
274. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994).
275. Does I, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672, 704–05 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
276. See id. at 707.
277. Id.
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occurred. 278 Consequently, the Michigan legislature’s retroactive application of registration obligations as such, 279 as well as the retroactive application of registration
obligations for longer periods of time, survived rational basis review. 280 Does I effectively closes the door on due process retroactivity challenges to MSORA, which
imposes fewer obligations and restrictions on sex offenders than the old MSORA,
unless courts are willing to depart from the well-established principle that MSORA
is justified on public safety grounds. 281
2.

Rational Basis for MSORA Generally

Courts determined that MSORA promoted awareness of sex offenders so that
members of the public could avoid them if desired—an appropriate response considering the allegedly high likelihood that sex offenders will commit another sex
crime 282 and the seriousness of the crimes that sex offenders commit. 283 Additionally, MSORA allowed law enforcement to more easily apprehend registered sex offenders who do offend again. 284 Courts have also held that MSORA has a rational
basis for treating different classes of sex offenders differently without any individualized assessment of risk, 285 a view explicitly repudiated by Does I Appeal and
Betts. 286

278. Id. at 708–10.
279. Doe v. Snyder (Does I), 101 F. Supp. 3d 722, 726–30 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
280. Does I, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672, 710 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
281. The plaintiffs in Does III raise the same argument as the Does I plaintiffs concerning MSORA’s retractive imposition of lifetime reporting requirements framed as an ex post facto challenge. Verified Class
Action Complaint at 168–69, Does III, No. 2:22-cv-10209 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2022). The Does III plaintiffs
also argue that the Michigan legislature’s alleged retroactive alteration of sex offenders’ plea agreements warrants strict scrutiny. Id. at 179–81.
282. Doe v. Kelly, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Haddad, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1094; TD, 823
N.W.2d at 110; see also Akella, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 733 (holding that likelihood that sex offenders will re-offend
is irrelevant).
283. Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Haddad, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
284. Doe v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491,
501 (6th Cir. 2007); Patton, 925 N.W.2d at 913.
285. Munoz, 507 F.3d at 966 (“This court has already held that the state has a rational basis for treating sex
offenders differently from other offenders by requiring them to register.” (citing Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d
466, 482–83 (6th Cir. 1999)); Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d at 504–06 (holding that Michigan could
rationally require all pre-October 2004 youthful trainees convicted of sex offenses to continue registering as sex
offenders even though post-October 2004 youthful offenders convicted of sex offenses were required to register
as sex offenders only if they failed to complete their HYTA requirements); accord Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d
105, 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2014); Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2014).
But see supra note 191 (discussing Dipiazza which held that the issue litigated in Mich. Dep’t of State Police
was cruel and unusual punishment as applied).
286. See Does I Appeal, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016); People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497, 512–15 (Mich.
2021).
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The Sixth Circuit 287 and the Michigan Supreme Court 288 questioned whether
MSORA legitimately advanced public safety based on several comprehensive studies
analyzing data concerning convicted sex offenders. 289 Dr. Patrick Langan et al.290
and Dr. Mariel Alper & Matthew Durose 291 concluded that sex offenders are less
likely to re-offend than other types of criminals. Professors J.J Prescott & Jonah
Rocktoff 292 and Professor Beth Huebner et al. 293 reported increases in recidivism
among sex offenders following States’ implementations of sex offender registration
schemes. The courts cited these data supporting their conclusions regarding MSORA
while ignoring other data tending to undermine their conclusions.
The courts’ conclusions that sex offenders were less likely than other types of
criminals to be re-arrested based on Langan et al. and Alper & Durose paints an incomplete picture. That the sex offenders tracked in both studies were less likely than
individuals convicted of other crimes to be re-arrested for any crime is arguably irrelevant because MSORA’s purpose is to protect the public from sex crimes, not all
crimes. 294 The relevant statistic is the likelihood that convicted sex offenders will
commit another sex crime.
Studies cited by both courts indicate that sex offenders are more likely than individuals arrested for other crimes to commit another sexual offense. Langan et al.
reported that thirty percent of the child molesters and nearly forty percent of the statutory rapists they tracked had prior arrests for sex offenses. 295 According to Alper
& Durose, “[s]ex offenders were three times as likely as other offenders to be arrested
for rape or sexual assault during the 9 years following release.” 296 These data imply
that convicted sex offenders pose a cognizable risk of committing a sex crime following their release from prison in general, and the risk that convicted sex offenders
will commit a sex crime is higher than the risk that individuals released from prison
for other crimes will commit a sex crime. Other researchers support this

287. See Does I Appeal, 834 F. 3d 696, 704–05 (6th Cir. 2016) (first citing PATRICK E. LANGAN ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 198281, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003), h
ttps://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf, and then citing J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 161 (2011)).
288. People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497, 514 (Mich. 2021) (first citing MARIEL ALPER & MATTHEW DUROSE,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251773, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM STATE PRISON: A 9-YEAR
FOLLOW-UP (2005–14) (2019), https://bjs.ojp.gov/redirect-legacy/content/pub/pdf/rsorsp9yfu0514_sum.pdf;
then citing BETH M. HUEBNER ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS IN
MICHIGAN AND MISSOURI 72 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242952.pdf; and then citing
Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 287, at 192)).
289. See also Joshua E. Montgomery, Note, Fixing a Non-Existent Problem with an Ineffective Solution:
Doe v. Snyder and Michigan’s Punitive Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws, 51 AKRON L. REV.
537, 569–73 (2018) (detailing studies cited by the courts).
290. LANGAN ET AL., supra note 287, at 14.
291. ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 288, at 5 tbl. 3.
292. Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 287, at 192.
293. HUEBNER ET AL., supra note 288, at 69.
294. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.721a (West 2020) (“[T]he sex offenders registration act was enacted . . . with the intent to . . . prevent[] and protect[] against the commission of future criminal sexual acts by
convicted sex offenders.” (emphasis added)).
295. LANGAN ET AL., supra note 287, at 12 tbl. 6.
296. ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 288, at 5.
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conclusion. 297 If MSORA increases recidivism, however, then these data are less
persuasive.
The studies cited by Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court imply that
MSORA does not fulfill its purported purpose to reduce sex crimes. 298 Prescott &
Rocktoff argued that sex offender laws are at best ineffective and at worst increase
recidivism, 299 and Huebner found that Michigan’s student safety restrictions increased the likelihood that convicted sex offenders would re-offend. 300 However,
other researchers, including Vásquez, found the opposite concerning other States’ sex
offender laws. 301 Even if there is a correlation between MSORA and increased incidents of sexual violence among registered sex offenders, a direct causal link between
MSORA and sex offender recidivism is hardly the only reasonable conclusion.
For example, among States where Vásquez et al. observed increases in incidents
of sexual violence among registered sex offenders following the implementation of
sex offender registration regimes, they reasoned that more sex crimes might have
been reported and discovered in those States due to increased attention placed on
crimes of sexual violence and a greater ability on the part of law enforcement to apprehend sex offenders attributable to those States’ sex offender laws. 302 In any case,
the data are clear that sex offenders are more likely than individuals convicted of
other crimes to commit a sex crime, and there is no academic consensus concerning
whether sex offender registration laws increase recidivism among sex offenders.
If courts no longer use the Due Process Clause to invalidate laws “because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought,” 303 then the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses should be no

297. See Bob Edward Vásquez et al., The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in
the United States: A Time-Series Analysis, 54 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 175 (2008); Ralph C. Serin et al., Psychopathy, Deviant Sexual Arousal, and Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
234 (2001).
298. Montgomery, supra note 289, at 574 (“If the federal courts will accept that recidivism rates are not
frighteningly high and that [sex offender registration acts] do not reduce recidivism, then a rational connection
to a non-punitive purpose will not be present.”).
299. See Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 287, at 180 tbl. 3, 183 tbl. 4, 195 tbl. 5, 189 tbl. 6; see also Kristin
M. Zgoba & Meghan M. Mitchell, The Effectiveness of Sex Offender Registration and Notification: A MetaAnalysis of 25 Years of Findings, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming), https://doi.org/10.1007/s112
92-021-09480-z (concluding based on meta-analysis of several studies that sex offender laws have no effect on
recidivism).
300. See HUEBNER ET AL., supra note 288, at 50 tbl. 13. However, Huebner et al. concluded that “if residency restrictions have an effect on recidivism, the relationship will be very small.” Id. at 69. Furthermore,
MSORA’s residency restrictions were repealed. Supra note 113.
301. Vásquez et al., supra note 297, at 187; see also Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., Effects of South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Policy on Deterrence of Adult Sex Crimes, 37 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAVIOR 537 (2010); Grant Duwe & William Donnay, The Impact of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Recidivism: The Minnesota Experience, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 411, (2008); WASH. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, SEX OFFENDER
SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE: HAS COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION REDUCED RECIDIVISM? (2005), https://
www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/919/Wsipp_Has-Community-Notification-Reduced-Recidivism_Report.pdf.
302. Vásquez et al., supra note 297, at 188.
303. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
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exception. 304 Moreover, MSORA is now well within the norm of other States’ sex
offender registration regimes 305 and federal guidelines. 306
The Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court have ventured into uncharted
territory. 307 It is unclear whether they will continue to evaluate whether a rational
basis for MSORA exists based on some researchers’ interpretations of data concerning incident rates of sexual violence. 308 However, what is clear is that the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court have endorsed a particular interpretation of sex
offender registration laws about which reasonable minds could differ.
VII. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FIRST
AMENDMENTS
Registered sex offenders have unsuccessfully claimed that MSORA violates several other constitutional rights, 309 including the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the right to anonymous speech protected by the
First Amendment. Claims that MSORA infringes on the right to a jury trial may be
more viable if courts follow Does I Appeal and People v. Betts and hold that MSORA
imposes punishment. Courts are more likely to recognize that MSORA violates the
First Amendment in light of changes to Michigan’s PSOR enacted by 2020 P.A. 295.
304. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (“The excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the
problem it seeks to remedy.”); see also Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 505–506 (6th Cir.
2007) (“[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis ‘is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices.’” (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993))); In re TD, 823
N.W.2d 101, 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (same), vacating as moot 821 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012) (“[A] statute
is constitutional ‘if the legislative judgement is supported by any set of facts, either known or which could
reasonably be assumed, even if such facts may be debatable.’” (quoting TIG Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 629
N.W.2d 402, 407 (Mich. 2001))).
305. See ANDREW J. HARRIS ET AL., INFORMATION SHARING AND THE ROLE OF SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT app. A (2020), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/254680.pdf (detailing every State’s sex offender registration statutes).
306. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 2, Snyder v. Doe, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (mem.) (No.
16-768), 2017 WL 2929534 (detailing differences between the old MSORA and federal guidelines); see also
The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,029 (July 2, 2008);
cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.11A–H (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 5, 2021) (detailing model sex offender registration statute that is stricter than the new MSORA in many ways).
307. See Melissa Hamilton, Constitutional Law and the Role of Scientific Evidence: The Transformative
Potential of Doe v. Snyder, 58 B.C. L. REV. ELEC. SUPPLEMENT 34, 40–41 (2017).
308. The Does III plaintiffs argue that the new MSORA still violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Verified
Class Action Complaint at 166–68, Does III, No. 2:22-cv-10209 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2022).
309. Several individuals incarcerated for sex offenses in Michigan have unsuccessfully argued that conditioning parole or probation on their participation in sex offender treatment programs violated their rights against
self-incrimination because their consent to treatment would have amounted to an admission that they require
treatment, and therefore that they are guilty. See Morris v. Berghuis, No. 2:12-CV-10417, 2013 WL 1874872,
at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2013); Spencer v. Atterberry, No. 1:10-cv-735, 2011 WL 65866, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Jan. 10, 2011); Rice v. Mich. Parole Bd., No. 1:05-CV-549, 2005 WL 2297436, at *3– 4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 21,
2005). This view is supported by a plurality of the Supreme Court in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35 (2002),
which held that that conditioning sex offenders’ receipt of probation or parole on their participation in sex offender treatment does not infringe on their rights against self-incrimination. Accord Roman v. DiGuglielmo,
675 F.3d 204, 214–15 (3d. Cir. 2012); Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1217 n.9 (10th Cir. 2004); Ainsworth
v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 4–6 (1st Cir. 2002); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 832–33 (9th Cir. 1997). Consequently, courts are unlikely to change their views absent a change in controlling precedent.
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Right to a Jury Trial

In People v. Golba, 310 the defendant argued that requiring him to register as a
sex offender violated the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey 311 and Blakely v.
Washington, 312 namely, that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments preclude courts from
increasing defendants’ sentences beyond statutory maximums based on facts that
were not submitted to a jury. 313 The defendant argued that the court, and not the jury,
had found that his conviction required MSORA registration, and therefore the court
had increased his punishment by requiring his registration and compliance with
MSORA based on this finding in excess of the statutory minimum punishment for his
offense of conviction. 314
In Golba, whether the trial court’s order violated the Fourth and Sixth Amendments turned on whether compliance with MSORA is “punishment” within the meaning of the Apprendi-Blakely rule. 315 The court held that MSORA did not impose
punishment, and therefore the trial court did not increase the defendant’s punishment
based on a fact not submitted to the jury. 316 It is possible that if courts reverse course
in line with Does I Appeal and Betts and hold that MSORA imposes punishment, then
registrants could successfully challenge the statute on the grounds rejected in
Golba. 317
B.

Right to Anonymous Speech

Laws which restrict speech must be “justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech,” “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” and must “leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” 318 The Does I plaintiffs argued that the MSORA provision requiring
them to report all online usernames upon initial registration and immediately update
changes to any online username in-person within three days violated their First
Amendment rights to anonymous speech. 319
The parties conceded that the State had a compelling interest in preventing sex
crimes, and the court held that the challenged provisions were content-neutral and
that the plaintiff’s rights to anonymous speech were not infringed because MSORA

310. 729 N.W.2d 916 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
311. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
312. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
313. Golba, 729 N.W.2d at 615.
314. Id. at 605, 615.
315. Id. at 615.
316. Id. at 617–21; cf. Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F. 3d 707, 717 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Apprendi claim
challenging sex offender registration was not cognizable on habeas review because the plaintiff was not “in
custody.”).
317. But see U.S. v. Hardeman, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the fact of prior
conviction upon which sex offender registration depends need not be submitted to a jury under Apprendi).
318. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
319. Does I, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672, 701 (E.D. Mich. 2015); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (recognizing authors’ rights to be published anonymously).
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did not “unmask registrants’ anonymity to the public.” 320 However, the court held
that the internet reporting provisions unconstitutionally burdened registrants’ speech
because they were vague and required registrants to report updates to their internet
designations in person. 321
The Michigan legislature’s attempt to address Does I created other issues. 2020
P.A. 295 eliminated required in-person reporting, 322 exempted offenders convicted
after July 1, 2011 from the internet reporting requirements, 323 and amended the definition of “online identifiers” to address vagueness issues. 324 The court’s conclusion
in Does I that MSORA’s internet reporting requirements did not burden registrants’
rights to anonymous speech only makes sense in the context of the old MSORA,
which expressly forbid listing registrants’ online usernames in the PSOR. 325 While
the new MSORA does not require registrants’ online usernames to be listed in the
PSOR, the statute no longer prohibits it. 326
Federal appellate courts are split on whether the potential that law enforcement
will publicly disclose sex offenders’ online usernames impermissibly chills registrants’ rights to anonymous speech. 327 Interestingly, neither circuit that addressed
whether state sex offender registries chilled speech discussed SORNA, which prohibits states from listing registrants’ online usernames in any public sex offender database. 328 As such, it is unclear whether SORNA’s restrictions on state registries
sufficiently protect Michigan registrants’ anonymous speech, and the Michigan legislature should remove law enforcement’s discretion under state law to list offenders’
online usernames in the PSOR to prevent a First Amendment challenge to the statute. 329
CONCLUSION
MSORA has been amended many times since its enactment. Over the last
twenty-five years, changes to the statute have generally made compliance more

320. Does I, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 703.
321. Id. at 704; accord Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563, 578–82 (9th Cir. 2014).
322. Act of Dec. 29, 2020, Pub. Act No. 295, § 5(1), 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. 2232, 2239.
323. Id. § 5(2)(a).
324. Id. § 2(g), 2020 Mich. Legis. Serv. at 2233.
325. Act of Apr. 12, 2011, Pub. Act No. 18, § 8(3)(e), 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 92, 98.
326. Act of Dec. 29, 2020, § 8(3).
327. Compare Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563, 579–91 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that California’s sex offender
registration law chilled anonymous speech because law enforcement could release offenders’ online usernames
to the public), with Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1224 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting claim that a registrants’
First Amendment rights were chilled because sex offender registration statute did not prevent the State from
publishing his online usernames and because his usernames were possessed by law enforcement).
328. 28 U.S.C. §§ 20916(c), 20920(b)(4) (2018 Supp. II); Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 1,630, 1,637 (Jan. 11, 2011); see also Registration Requirements Under
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 69,856, 68,858 (Dec. 8, 2021) (“Disclosure
of sex offender information is separately addressed in statutory provisions that are not implicated by this rulemaking and in the SORNA Guidelines and SORNA Supplemental Guidelines.”).
329. The Does III plaintiffs have raised an anonymous speech challenge on these grounds, Verified Class
Action Complaint at 186–88, Does III, No. 2:22-cv-10209 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2022), which the Michigan
legislature could render moot by amending MSORA.
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difficult until the Sixth Circuit invalidated the entire statute under federal law. A
subsequent Michigan Supreme Court decision also nullified the statute on state law
grounds. Amendments enacted after the Sixth Circuit’s decision vastly reduced the
obligations and restrictions imposed on sex offenders by MSORA, and courts treat
the amended statute as a “new” law. Though the constitutionality of the new statute
is unclear, a close examination of the statute’s history and past decisions concerning
challenges to it, some conclusions can be drawn.
For example, certain constitutional challenges to MSORA are unlikely to be successful. MSORA is almost certainly not a bill of attainder because it does not punish
a political class, and the Michigan legislature did not create MSORA to punish sex
offenders. Similarly, registrants challenging MSORA on procedural due process
grounds will likely not succeed because the statute applies to individuals convicted
of crimes, and criminal trials provide registrants with adequate process. However,
the Ninth Circuit recognized that procedures nearly identical to MSORA’s were inadequate concerning individuals wrongly subjected to California’s sex offender registration statute. 330 Michigan should identify individuals currently complying with
MSORA who are not subject to the statute or whose information is incorrectly listed
in the public registry and take steps to remedy these issues.
The federal and state double jeopardy, ex post facto, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses uniquely interact concerning challenges to sex offender registration
laws. The federal and Michigan constitutions’ cruel and unusual punishment clauses
are moot concerning challenges to MSORA because the double jeopardy and ex post
facto clauses prohibit punishing sex offenders regardless of whether the punishment
is also cruel and unusual. The double jeopardy clauses of the federal and Michigan
constitutions prevent the State from punishing sex offenders both proactively and
retroactively, while the ex post facto clauses prevent only the latter. However, successful ex post facto challenges to MSORA may result in courts invalidating more of
the statute than successful double jeopardy challenges.
Ex post facto, double jeopardy, equal protection, and substantive due process
challenges to MSORA have become more viable after Does I Appeal and Betts.
Courts will likely apply the rational basis test to MSORA and not strict scrutiny in
equal protection and substantive due process cases. The rational basis test is also
implicated as part of the intent–effects test applicable in double jeopardy and ex post
facto cases.
In the past, courts have uniformly held that MSORA was rationally related to
public safety, but the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court disagreed in the
ex post facto context. Rational minds could disagree with the courts’ conclusions in
Does I Appeal and Betts—conclusions applicable in not only ex post facto cases but
in equal protection, substantive due process, and double jeopardy cases as well.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s and Michigan Supreme Court’s conclusions that
MSORA imposed punishment could influence whether the question of the statute’s
applicability to convicted sex offenders must be submitted to a jury.

330. Id. 772 F.3d at 579–91.
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The MSORA amendments to enacted in response to Does I Appeal and Betts also
made a First Amendment challenge more viable by removing the statutory restriction
on listing offenders’ online usernames in the PSOR, even though the State, even
though the PSOR does not currently include offenders’ usernames. The mere possibility that the State will publicly list offenders’ usernames potentially burdens offenders’ rights to anonymous speech. The danger that offenders’ speech will be de-anonymized may unconstitutionally burden offenders’ speech. The State should amend
MSORA to explicitly exclude registrants’ online designations from the PSOR.
Whether Does I Appeal will, as some scholars contend, revolutionize federal
courts’ approaches to sex offender registration legislation remains to be seen. 331
However, the Betts decision has already had a demonstrable effect in Michigan. The
Michigan Supreme Court recently vacated several defendants’ convictions for
MSORA violations that occurred between the 2011 and 2021 amendments where
those defendants’ convictions for listed offenses pre–dated the 2011 amendments because MSORA was an ex post facto law as applied to them. 332 The broader implications of these recent cases are unclear.
For example, is every individual convicted for MSORA violations between the
2011 and 2021 amendments whose convictions for listed offenses pre-date the 2011
amendments entitled to have their conviction vacated? The Michigan Supreme Court
implies that the answer is yes. If this is correct, then how will courts treat individuals
whose sentences for other crimes were increased based on convictions for MSORA
violations? How will other States whose sex offender statutes impose more stringent
requirements on individuals with out-of-state convictions for failing to comply with
another State’s sex offender registration statutes treat in-state offenders with MSORA
convictions?
If the legislature does not address these concerns and those discussed above
through legislation, it will risk another successful challenge to the statute in toto. In
the future, the legislature should critically evaluate any additions to MSORA’s registration requirements before the amendments are passed, so that the legality of the
statute is no longer determined ex post facto.

331. See Ramage, supra note 171, at 1127–29.
332. People v. Almadrahi, 969 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. 2022) (mem.); People v. Bosca, 969 N.W.2d 55 (Mich.
2022) (mem.); People v. Fleck, 969 N.W.2d 14 (Mich. 2022) (mem.); People v. Hadley, 969 N.W.2d 14 (Mich.
2022) (mem.); People v. Pohly, 969 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2022) (mem.); People v. Smith, 969 N.W.2d 15 (Mich.
2022) (mem.); People v. Werner, 969 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2022) (mem.).

